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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Abstract 
This research explores the Department of Defense (DoD) Government Purchase 
Card Program. The specific purpose of this research is to identify fraud indicators 
within the DoD Government Purchase Card Programs. This research identifies fraud 
indicators within the DoD Government Purchase Card Programs and provides 
recommendations for improving the management of Government Purchase Card 
Programs within the DoD. First, a brief background of the DoD Government 
Purchase Card Program is provided. Second, based on GAO reports and OIG 
audits, incidents of procurement card fraud are discussed. Third, fraud indicators in 
Government Purchase Card Programs are identified. Fourth, Government Purchase 
Card Program Internal Control Issues are addressed. Finally, the research concludes 
with a summary and areas for further research. 
Introduction 
The purpose of this research paper is to identify procurement fraud indicators in 
Defense agencies, specifically in the area of Government Purchase Card Programs 
(GPCPs).  The areas covered in this research paper include a brief background of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) Government Purchase Card Program, a discussion of 
incidents of procurement card fraud, and the identification of fraud indicators in Government 
Purchase Card Programs. In addition, Government Purchase Card Program internal control 
issues are also addressed. A summary and conclusion will be provided, and areas for 
further research will be identified. 
As of 2006, the Government Purchase Card Program was approximately eight times 
larger than the next largest purchase card program in the commercial card world (Firscher, 
2006). With billions of taxpayer dollars being spent on goods and services by the federal 
government on behalf of the American people, the general public demands better 
stewardship, efficient management of funds, and greater accountability for resources by 
government organizations (Mills et al., 2008).  Over the years, the Government Purchase 
Card Program has become an increasingly valuable and vital tool in government agencies in 
efforts to streamline their procurement process and meet their missions, especially in the 
Department of Defense. The following section will provide a brief background of the DoD 
Government Purchase Card Program. 
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Background on DoD Government Purchase Card Program 
The subject of government purchase cards dates back to 1982 when President 
Ronald Reagan issued an executive order directing executive government agencies to 
decrease administrative procurement costs (GAO, 1996). 
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]) oversees the agency-wide Government Purchase Card Program 
(GPCP). The Purchase Card Program Management Office (PCPMO) is responsible for 
policy formulation, procedural guidance, and operational oversight of the GPCP 
administered by DoD components, and it reports to the Director of Defense Procurement 
and Acquisition Policy in OUSD(AT&L). 
The Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) office, headed by Mr. Shay 
Assad, is responsible for all acquisition and procurement policy matters in the Department of 
Defense (DoD) and serves as the main advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) and the Defense Acquisition Board on 
acquisition/procurement strategies for all major weapon systems programs, major 
automated information systems programs, and services acquisitions (DPAP, 2011). 
The SmartPay® Program, known as the largest government charge card program in 
the world, provides 350 federal agencies, organizations, and tribal governments commercial 
charge card-based procurement and payment assistance to make efficient and convenient 
procurement transactions. According to the General Services Administration (GSA), which 
administers the program under a master contract, the SmartPay® Program has saved 
federal agencies an estimated $1.8 billion in annual administrative processing costs as 
compared to previous, paper-based procurement card processes. The Office of Charge 
Card Management (OCCM) within GSA manages the GSA SmartPay® Program (OCCM, 
2011; OMB, 2009). 
The use of government purchase cards has skyrocketed since the purchase cards 
first became available in 1986. Struebing (1996) found that during the first year that the 
government purchase cards were made available agency-wide, there were approximately 
271,000 purchases made worth approximately $64 million taxpayer dollars. From fiscal year 
1990 to fiscal year 1995, the government purchase card usage increased by 1, 500%. By 
the end of fiscal year 1995, cardholders used the purchase card to purchase more than $1.6 
billion taxpayer dollars worth of goods and services (Struebing, 1996). Most government 
officials agree that the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) needs to address the use of 
government purchase cards more thoroughly and provide ways in which government 
agencies can share best practices in the area of purchase card programs (GAO, 1996). 
As shown in Figure 1, during fiscal year 2009, the agency-wide Government 
Purchase Card Program, which includes purchase, travel, and fleet cards, totaled 3.1 million 
cardholders, 93.2 million transactions, and $29.8 billion in spending, and during fiscal year 
2010, the GPCP program totaled 3.1 million cardholders, 98.9 million in transactions, and 
$30.2 billion in spending (GSA, 2011). While there are several types of government charge 
cards, the focus of this research was on the purchase cards.  Figure 2 shows a downward 
trend for the number of cardholders yet an upward trend in purchase card transactions and 
purchase card spending. 
On January 15, 2009, the OMB issued OMB Circular A-123, Appendix B Revised in 
efforts to consolidate current government-wide charge card program requirements and 
guidance issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), General Services 
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Administration (GSA), Department of the Treasury (Treasury), and other federal agencies. 
The Circular is issued under the authority of 31 U.S.C. 1111; Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 
1970; Executive Order 11541; the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-576); and 
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. Chapter 7; OMB, 2009). 
Although credit-worthiness evaluations are required for travel charge card holders, 
the credit worthiness evaluations for new purchase card applicants are no longer 
legislatively mandated due to the passage of the 2006 Consolidated Appropriations Act. 
However, agency officials and charge card managers are allowed to continue requiring 
these evaluations at their discretion as they consider the risks involved with charge card 
issuance (OMB, 2009). The following section will discuss incidents of government 
procurement card fraud as identified in some GAO and OIG Government Purchase Card 
Program audit results. 
 









Figure 2. GSA SmartPay Program—Purchase Card (FY1999 to FY2008) 
(GSA, n.d.) 
Incidents of Government Procurement Card Fraud 
The  DoD GPCP is subject to periodic audits in accordance with Title 10 United 
States Code, Section 2784(b)(8), by the DoD Inspector General and the Military Services’ 
audit agencies (DoD, 2010e). 
Over the years, the escalating federal government procurement fraud scandals have 
created a need to seriously revisit the reality of the epidemic of procurement fraudulent 
activities across federal agencies. In 2002, the GAO found significant internal control 
weaknesses in government agency purchase card programs that allowed cardholders to 
make fraudulent purchases (GAO, 2002). Also in 2002, the Defense Criminal Investigative 
Service (DCIS) opened investigations which involved individuals allegedly involved in credit 
card fraud. Additionally, the DCIS completed cases which have resulted in jail terms and 
probation as well as restitution (Kozaryn, 2002). 
According to a DoD Inspector General (IG) report in 2002, purchase card audits and 
investigations revealed incidents of abuse and fraud citing causes to include inadequate 
command emphasis and poorly enforced internal controls (DoD IG, 2002).  As a result of the 
highly publicized procurement fraud scandals, congressional leaders, such as Senator 
Charles Grassley, have called for more stringent oversight of Government Purchase Card 
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Programs (Gupta & Palmer, 2007). The following section will discuss potential fraud 
indicators in Government Purchase Card Programs. 
Fraud Indicators in Government Purchase Card Programs 
When DoD auditors are determining the fraud indicators and risk factors involved in a 
case, they should not merely take into consideration the materiality or monetary impact, but 
should also consider other important non-quantitative aspects such as the safety and 
welfare of service members and civilians. If DoD auditors find fraud indicators or risk factors 
that relate to such qualitative factors, a significantly lower threshold should be used for 
categorizing an area as high risk. DoD auditors are expected to uphold their fiduciary duties 
and responsibilities to the Department of Defense, the U.S. government, and the Public 
(DoD IG, 2010). 
Potential indicators of fraudulent activity are clues or red flags that warrant a closer 
investigation into a certain area or activity. Intent is the key determining factor as to whether 
a particular situation is deemed fraud or mere negligence. The DoD Inspector General’s 
website provides fraud guidance for their auditors citing numerous, but not all inclusive, 
possible purchase card fraud indicators. As outlined in Figure 3, some possible purchase 
card fraud indicators include but are not limited to inadequate separation of duties such as 
cardholders approving their own purchase authorizations, cardholder and vendor have the 
same name, and similar invoices from different vendors (DoD IG, 2010). 
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Purchase Card Fraud Indicators 
  
¾ Numerous missing invoices, receipts, and purchase justifications.  
¾ Receipts contain “white-outs,” date changes, and changes to product descriptions.  
¾ Purchased items are not recorded in inventory records.  
¾ Pattern of repeat favoritism to a specific vendor or group of vendors.  
¾ Purchases fall at, or slightly below, the purchase threshold of $3,000.  
¾ Absence of independent receipt and acceptance of purchased items.  
¾ Organization does not conduct periodic reviews of cardholder purchases and 
inventory. 
¾ One cardholder, or a small number of cardholders, makes repeat purchases from a 
specific vendor.  
¾ Research shows that a vendor or company may not be authentic (i.e., phony business 
address or no evidence that the company is incorporated, etc.); fictitious vendor.  
¾ Management does not follow established purchase card procedures such as requiring 
purchase justifications, independent receipt and acceptance of purchased items, and 
periodic reviews of cardholder transactions. 
¾ Cardholder makes unauthorized week-end purchases.  
¾  Cardholder pays an excessive amount for routine purchases.  
¾ Pattern of suspect cardholder purchases from unauthorized vendors such as clothing 
stores or suspect online vendors.  
¾ Pattern of cardholder accounts with disputed charges.  
¾ Pilferable items are repeatedly reported as lost, missing, or stolen.  
¾ Separated employees continue to make purchases using the government purchase 
card.  
¾ Inadequate separation of duties such as cardholders approving their own purchase 
authorizations.  
¾ Purchase logs do not contain descriptions of items purchased.  
¾ Cardholder and vendor have the same name.  
¾ Cardholder account records are incomplete.  
¾ Cardholder accounts with several limit increases occurring within a short time.  
¾ Cardholder purchases exceed the authorized card limit.  
¾ Purchases appear to be outside of the normal purchase pattern of the cardholder.  
¾ Similar invoices from different vendors.  
¾ Subversion of management controls by the cardholder and/or approving authority.  
¾ Excessive number of cardholders within an activity or unit.  
¾ Purchase items are available through the supply system.  
¾ Cardholder does not turn in premiums/free products obtained with purchases.  
¾ Organization has no established controls over purchases returned to stores for cash.  
¾ Purchase card assigned to an office or group of individuals instead of a specific 
person.  
¾ An excessive number of cardholders are assigned to one approving official.  
 
Figure 3. Purchase Card Fraud Indicators 
(DoD IG, 2010) 
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In addition, the Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA) Handbook (1997) on fraud and waste 
indicators defines fraud as “an illegal act where one obtains something of value through 
willful misrepresentation” (p. 1). The AFAA Handbook (1997) outlines the following common 
elements that exist in fraudulent activities: 
1. Intent—willfully committing a wrongful act which must be proven through a 
pattern of activity such as repeated engagement in the wrongful activity or 
making conflicting statements. 
2. Disguise of Purpose–misrepresentations made to accomplish the scheme 
when representations are made that were false by either omission or 
commission. 
3. Reliance— the offender knowingly makes a misrepresentation that is relied 
upon and acted upon by the victim. 
4. Voluntary— the victim assists the offender; for example, in a case of 
employee theft,  the victim (Air Force) entrusted the care of assets to the 
offender which established a fiduciary capacity. 
5. Concealment— hiding or preventing knowledge of the fraudulent activity. 
6. Injury or Damage— the victim (Air Force) suffers a loss of money or property 
because he/she relied and acted upon the misrepresentation. (pp. 1–2) 
Red flags or fraud indicators can be categorized into three types to include 
situational and opportunity red flags for either personal gain or for organizational benefit and 
personal characteristics red flags, which include low moral character, wheeler-dealer 
attitude, rationalization of contradictory behavior, poor credit rating or financial status, and 
lack of stability (Air Force Audit, 1997, pp. 4–7). Table 1 shows examples of situational red 
flags or fraud indicators which include such things as living beyond one’s means or 
inadequate income or greed for personal gain and urgent need for favorable performance or 
temporary bad situation for organization benefit. Table 2 shows examples of opportunity red 
flags or fraud indicators such as close association with suppliers and key people or too 
much trust in key employees for personal gain and poor internal controls or related party 
transactions for organizational benefit. It should be noted that these fraud indicators are 
merely an indication of possible fraudulent activities; they do not guarantee that actual 
fraudulent activities are taking place (Air Force Audit, 1997). 
Furthermore, government auditors use data mining techniques to help identify 
suspicious purchase card transactions by reviewing unusual or questionable transactions 
such as those that occur on weekends, purchases from unauthorized vendors, split 
purchases, and purchases slightly below the $3,000 threshold for micro-purchases. Data 
mining is a computer-based tool that is used by auditors to sort through numerous amounts 
of data to pick out relevant information and reveal patterns (DoD IG, 2010). The following 
section will discuss Government Purchase Card Program internal control issues. 
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Table 1. Situational Red Flags/Fraud Indicators 
(Air Force Audit, 1997) 
For Personal Gain For Organizational Benefit 
High personal debt or losses Heavy expenditures 
Living beyond one’s means Urgent need for favorable performance 
Gambling or speculation Revoked or imperiled mission status 
Excessive use of alcohol or liquor Unfavorable economic conditions 
Perceived inequities in the organization Temporary bad situation 
Resentment of supervisors Insufficient working capital/equipment 
Inadequate income or greed Obsolete inventories/production assets 
Table 2. Opportunity Red Flags/Fraud Indicators 
(Air Force Audit, 1997) 
For Personal Gain For Organizational Benefit 
Familiarity with operations and position 
of trust 
Related party transactions 
Close association with suppliers and key 
people 
Poor accounting records 
Dominant top management Poor internal controls 
Dishonest or unethical management Inexperienced people in key positions 
Too much trust in key employees Reluctant to give auditors needed data 
Rapid turnover of key employees Continuous problems with inspectors 
Inadequate training programs Highly computerized organization 
Weak or dishonest personnel 
evaluations 
Inadequate staffing in critical positions 
Government Purchase Card Program Internal Control Issues 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Internal Controls 
The importance of transparency, trust, and confidence in government governance 
cannot be overemphasized. The U.S. Congress, in response to public accounting failures, 
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the Act) in efforts to deter fraudulent activities 
(Latshaw, 2003; Marden & Edwards, 2005). The Act revised the regulation of accounting 
firms that audit public companies, transformed corporate reporting and enforcement, and 
included internal control requirements for publicly traded companies (Lander, 2004).  
Section 404 of the Act outlines the legislative requirements for internal controls for publicly 
traded companies (Sarbanes Oxley, 2002).  While the Act’s internal control requirements are 
for publicly traded companies, the components of internal controls are just as important in 
the federal government, specifically in the Government Purchase Card Programs agency-
wide. As the GAO reports and IG audits indicate, internal control violations eroded the 
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efficiency of controls over the management of Government Purchase Card Programs, which 
resulted in fraudulent activities (GAO, 2008). The next section will discuss the internal 
control framework. 
Internal Control Framework 
In compliance with the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA) 
requirement, the General Accounting Office (GAO) developed relevant updated internal 
control guidance based on the private sector’s Internal Control —Integrated Framework, 
which is published by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO), (Whittington & Pany, 2012).  In addition, the Federal Financial 
Management Improvement Act of 1996 identified internal control as an important and 
integral component of improving financial management systems. Therefore, in 1999, the 
GAO issued “Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government” to assist 
government managers in achieving their missions and program results and in improving 
accountability (GAO, 1999). 
Internal control is defined as a process designed to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories: (a) reliability of financial 
reporting, (b) effectiveness and efficiency of operations, and (c) compliance with applicable 
laws and regulations. The components of the internal control framework include the 
following: 
1. The Control Environment, 
2. Risk Assessment, 
3. The Accounting Information System, 
4. Control Activities, and 
5. Monitoring. (Whittington & Pany, 2012) 
In a 2001 memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, 
Logistics, and Technology), Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and 
Acquisition), Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), and directors of defense 
agencies, Bruce Sullivan, Director of the Purchase Card Joint Program Management Office, 
emphasized the need to allocate the appropriate resources necessary to have a system of 
internal and management controls in place that will help ensure that appropriate 
management of fraud related losses in order to protect the interests of the American public. 
He also addressed the issue of an appropriate span of control for billing officials citing 5–7 
cardholders per billing official as a general rule of thumb (Sullivan, 2001). 
Gillett, Fink, and Johnson (1997) note that government agencies must implement 
proper internal controls to make sure that correct information is recorded and maintained so 
that government purchases can be analyzed and reviewed in a timely manner. A serious 
breakdown in internal controls over purchase card programs can leave government 
agencies vulnerable to purchase card fraud and abuse (GAO, 2001). 
Colaianni (2005) believes that some internal controls that were implemented by the 
U. S. Department of State could prove useful in other GPCPs. She advocates the 
establishment of individual card dollar limits and the use of merchant category code 
restrictions. The enforcement of basic and refresher training and implementation of “on-line” 
training programs reduced administrative costs and increased procedure consistency at the 
U. S. Department of State. The identification of individual responsibilities and oversight and 
reporting requirements can also help improve GPCPs such as developing a standardized 
checklist or template to assist employees with requirements.  In addition, the enforcement of 
 =
=




annual program performance reviews assist in improving management oversight and 
increasing compliance with purchase card program requirements (Colaianni, 2005). 
Federal government officials, such as GPCP approving officials and cardholders, 
hold a public trust and are expected to meet the highest ethical standards, especially when 
working with millions of taxpayer dollars on behalf of the American people. Because fraud is 
a serious problem throughout the nation and for the public procurement arena, it is crucial 
that procurement officials receive the appropriate training and learn the skills necessary to 
deter and detect fraud within agency-wide Government Purchase Card Programs. 
Unfortunately, many government executives have failed to implement and follow the existing 
internal control policies that are in place to help deter and detect fraudulent activities (GAO, 
2008). Financial management transparency could be a significant and powerful fraud 
deterrent, and as Wells (2004) points out, occupational fraud is affected by the integrity level 
of government leaders and employees and the perception of detection. The following 
section will provide a summary and conclusion. 
Summary & Conclusion 
Even though purchase cards streamline the federal procurement process, the GAO 
reports since 2001 have shown that, if not managed and controlled appropriately, the use of 
government purchase cards can result in fraud, waste, and abuse (GAO, 2008). In light of all 
the recent federal procurement scandals, the emergence of additional guidance for 
Government Purchase Card Programs has been steadily increasing.  The more approving 
officials and cardholders are aware of perceived weaknesses in internal controls, the more 
likely they will be to take appropriate steps to reduce the potential for fraudulent activities.  
While Gupta and Palmer (2007) agree that the incidents of purchase card fraud, 
abuse, and misuse found by GAO and various Offices of Inspectors General are 
unacceptable, they also believe that there could be a significant opportunity cost associated 
with an under-used purchase card program.  Therefore, government officials need to have a 
balanced approach to managing their Government Purchase Card Programs.  
Margaret A. Colaianni (2005), the purchase card program manager of the U.S. 
Department of State, provides useful recommendations that could be implemented in other 
Government Purchase Card Programs. Colaianni believes that the three fundamental 
principles for the U.S. Department of State purchase card program, which include 
standardization, centralization, and collaboration, could be helpful in other federal agencies’ 
purchase card programs. 
Some best practices surfaced from the three underlying principles that she identified 
that could assist agencies in meeting the challenges and demands of managing 
Government Purchase Card Programs. For example, she recommends agencies 
standardize practices as much as possible such as in the areas of cardholder purchasing 
logs, procedures, guidance, and practices. Standardized processes can help in the 
reduction of the administrative burden, the improvement of reconciliation procedures, the 
cutback of costs, and the decrease in processing times (Colaianni, 2005). 
Colaianni (2005) believes that collaboration among team members, as well as with 
other agencies, participating banks, and the credit card associations is vitally important. 
Sharing best practices and strategies that work in the management of Government 
Purchase Card Programs is essential to the long-term success of any Government 
Purchase Card Program. She also recommends collaboration such as establishing a close 
working relationship between the purchasing and finance office that pays the invoices and 
establishing written operating procedures at the local level in addition to the agency-wide 
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guidance and procedures. Furthermore, she suggests keeping program and hierarchy 
information updated to account for any employee turnover as well as keeping cardholders’ 
established profile parameters current  (Colaianni, 2005). The following section discusses 
areas for further research. 
Areas for Further Research 
The recent GAO reports and IG audits have shown that there is a need for research 
in the area of procurement fraud in the Government Purchase Card Program (GAO, 2008). 
The focus of this research was to identify fraud indicators that could be used by DoD 
agencies to improve purchase card programs. Other research that could be done would be 
to expand on the identified fraud indicators and lead to the development of an assessment 
tool to be used in the identification of procurement fraud vulnerabilities in the Government 
Purchase Card Program. In addition, an analysis by specific government agencies such as 
the Navy, Air Force, and Army would be recommended. 
References 
Ahrens, T., & Dent, J. F. (1998). Accounting and organizations: Realizing the richness of 
field research. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 10(1). 
Air Force audit agency handbook. (1997). Retrieved from 
http://www.dodig.mil/Inspections/APO/fraud/AFAAFraudHandbook.pdf 
American Psychological Association (APA). (2010). Publication manual of the American 
psychological association (6th ed.). Washington, DC: Author. 
Colaianni, M. A. (2005). Principles and practices of managing a global purchase card 
program. Journal of Public Procurement, 5(1), 88–93. Retrieved from 
http://ippa.org/jopp/download/vol5/issue-1/PractitionerCorner_Article.pdf 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP). (2011). Retrieved from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ 
DoD. (2009, April 30). Department of Defense government charge card guidebook for 
establishing and managing purchase, travel, and fuel card programs. Retrieved from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pcard/pcardguidebook.pdf 
DoD. (2010a, August). Internal management controls. In DoD financial management 
regulation (Vol. 5). Retrieved from http://comptroller.defense.gov/fmr/05/05_01.pdf 
DoD. (2010b, September). Annex 1: Purchase card certification statements. In DoD financial 
management regulation (Vol. 10). Retrieved from 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/fmr/10/10_23_annex_1.pdf 
DoD. (2010c, September). Annex 2: Approving official (AO) and certifying official monthly 
review checklist. In DoD financial management regulation (Vol. 10). Retrieved from 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/fmr/10/10_23_annex_2.pdf 
DoD. (2010d, September). Introduction. In DoD financial management regulation. Retrieved 
from http://comptroller.defense.gov/fmr/intro.pdf 
DoD. (2010e, September). Summary of major changes to DoD 7000.14-R, purchase card 








DoD. (2010f, October). Department of Defense purchase card data management plan (Ver. 
1.1). Retrieved from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pdi/pc/docs/PC_Data_Study_2010[1].pdf 
DoD. (2010g, December). Smart cards for financial applications. In DoD financial 
management regulation (Vol. 5). Retrieved from 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/fmr/05/05_17.pdf 
DoD Inspector General (DoD IG). (2002, June 27). Department of Defense charge 
card task force final report. Retrieved from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/Charge_Card_TF_Final.pdf 
DoD Inspector General (DoD IG). (2010). Purchase card fraud indicators. Retrieved 
from http://www.dodig.mil/ 
Firscher, D. (2006, May). A growing method of payment evolves online. Contract 
Management, 46(5), 42–48. 
GAO. (1996, August 6). Acquisition reform: Purchase card use cuts procurement costs, 
improves efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-96-138). Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96138.pdf 
GAO. (1999, November). Standards for internal control in the federal government 
(GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1). Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/ai00021p.pdf 
GAO. (2001, July 30). Purchase cards: Control weaknesses leave two navy units vulnerable 
to fraud and abuse (GAO-01-995T). Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01995t.pdf 
GAO. (2002, May 1). Government purchase cards: Control weaknesses expose agencies to 
fraud and abuse (GAO-02-676T). Retrieved from  
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02676t.pdf 
GAO. (2008, March). Governmentwide purchase cards: Actions needed to strengthen 
internal controls to reduce fraudulent, improper, and abusive purchases (GAO-08-
333). Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov 
Gillett, J. W., Fink, R. L., & Johnson, L. T. (1997, December). Accounting controls in a 
procurement card environment. Management Accounting, 79(6), 47–51. 
GSA. (n.d.). GSA SmartPay performance summary. Retrieved from https://smartpay.gsa.gov 
GSA. (2010a). Retrieved from http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/102612 
GSA. (2010b, November 16). SmartPay 2 program. Retrieved from 
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104616 
GSA. (2011a). SmartPay statistics. Retrieved from https://smartpay.gsa.gov/about-gsa-
smartpay/program-statistics 
GSA. (2011b). GSA SmartPay program fiscal year 2010 executive summary. Retrieved from 
https://smartpay.gsa.gov/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/2010%20Executive%20Summar
y.pdf 
Gupta, M., & Palmer, R. (2007, Summer). Purchase card use by the U.S. government: 








Kozaryn, L. D. (2002, March 27). DoD fights government credit card abuse.  American 
Forces Press Service. Washington, DC. 
Lander, G. P. (2004). What is Sarbanes-Oxley? New York, NY: McGraw Hill. 
Latshaw, C. A. (2003, Spring). Fraudulent financial reporting: The government and 
accounting profession react. Review of Business, 13–15. 
Marden, R., & Edwards, R. (2005, April). The Sarbanes-Oxley ax. The CPA Journal, 75(4), 
6–9. 
Mills, T. H., Normand, C. J., & Palmer, R. J. (2008). Governmental purchase card programs: 
A case on the stewardship of public resources. Accounting Perspectives, 7(1) 69–81. 
Office of Charge Card Management (OCCM). (2011). Retrieved from 
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/105080 
OMB. (2009, January 15). Improving the management of government charge card 
programs (Circular A-123, Appendix B, Revised). Retrieved from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/circulars/a123/a123_app
endix_b.pdf 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, § 404 (2002). Retrieved from http://www.soxlaw.com/s404.htm 
Struebing, L. (1996, December). Credit card use cuts procurement costs and improves 
efficiency. Quality Progress, 29(12), 14.  
Sullivan, B. (2001, July 5). Internal and management controls—DoD purchase card program 
[Memorandum]. Retrieved from 
http://dodgpc.us.army.mil/Management%20Controls.pdf 
Wells, J. T. (2004, February). New approaches to fraud deterrence. Journal of Accountancy, 
197(2), 72–76.  
Whittington, O. R., & Pany, K. (2012). Principles of auditing and other assurance services 
(18th ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Irwin. 
Acknowledgements 
Sincere thanks go to RADM James B. Greene, USN (Ret.), the NPS Acquisition 
Chair, for securing funding for this research and to Dr. Keith F. Snider, Associate Professor 
of Public Administration and Management, for his support. In addition, special thanks to 
Karey Shaffer and Tera Yoder of the NPS Acquisition Research Program office for their 
dedication, support, and guidance. This research report would not have been possible 
without their assistance. And finally, special thanks to Dr. Rene G. Rendon, Associate 
Professor of Acquisition Management, for his constant support and encouragement, for 
which I am eternally grateful. 
